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INTRODUCTION 
Let’s make a deal. You pay me $200,000 for a four-year experience with 
no guarantee you will enjoy it or profit from it. During those four years, you 
are bound by the rules I write—and I may change them unilaterally and 
without notice. This deal must be accepted as is; there shall be no negotiating 
terms. If you don’t make this deal, you will likely be consigned to minimum 
wage work. Should you challenge in court any action I take, a judge will apply 
existing case law that instructs him or her to defer to my specialized judgment 
and my interpretation of the agreement. Do we have a deal? 
As this Comment will demonstrate, those are roughly the terms that 
govern students’ relationships with their universities, though it is doubtful 
 
† J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2020; M.A.T., Fitchburg State 
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that American high school students understand this reality as they search for 
the college of their dreams. One might argue this lack of understanding is of 
no consequence: perhaps few students who ultimately attend college ever 
seriously consider not attending college. After all, universities are seen as 
playing an absolutely critical role in modern society: they “educate our young 
people and create the skilled workforce that we need to compete with other 
countries”; they “train future doctors, nurses, teachers, engineers, and 
scientists”; they “build the technology and develop the business leaders that 
will create a better tomorrow”; they “lead the way in searching for cures to 
cancer” and other diseases; and they “play a key role in expanding 
opportunity and reducing income inequality for those who have been left out 
and left behind for too long.”1 Indeed, as of 2014, the earnings of a college 
graduate were over sixty percent higher than those of a worker who attained 
only a high school diploma.2 And perhaps most significantly, higher education 
is thought to operate as a “multiplier, enhancing the enjoyment of all 
individual rights and freedoms.”3 Can any institution which provides so many 
benefits not just to its students but to society at large—can any institution so 
revered—actually give students a raw deal? 
While universities in general provide a net benefit for society, they—like 
any institution—have at times abused their power. In the disciplinary context, 
universities have suspended or expelled students for, among other things, 
eating their meals in a forbidden place,4 smoking cigarettes,5 engaging in 
premarital sex,6 improperly using legal knowledge acquired in law school,7 
making unpatriotic statements,8 espousing atheistic views,9 joining forbidden 
secret societies,10 exhibiting a lack of good manners,11 disclosing pedophiliac 
urges,12 and protesting racial segregation.13 Outside the disciplinary context, 
some universities have quadrupled tuition over a three-year period with no 
 
1 The Rising Costs of Higher Education and Tax Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of 
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 114th Cong. 5 (2015) [hereinafter House Hearing] (statement of 
Rep. John Lewis, Member, H. Comm. on Ways and Means). 
2 Id. 
3 JANE KOTZMANN, THE HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO HIGHER EDUCATION: 
WHY HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS SHOULD GUIDE HIGHER EDUCATION LAW AND POLICY 2 
(2018) (internal quotations omitted). 
4 Gott v. Berea Coll., 161 S.W. 204, 205 (Ky. Ct. App. 1913). 
5 Tanton v. McKenney, 197 N.W. 510, 511 (Mich. 1924). 
6 Hall v. Lee Coll., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1027, 1028 (E.D. Tenn. 1996). 
7 White v. Portia Law Sch., 174 N.E. 187, 188 (Mass. 1931). 
8 People ex rel. Goldenkoff v. Albany Law Sch., 191 N.Y.S. 349, 350-51 (App. Div. 1921). 
9 Robinson v. Univ. of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442, 443 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). 
10 People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186, 186-87 (1866). 
11 Steier v. N.Y. State Educ. Comm’r, 271 F.2d 13, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1959). 
12 Gibson v. Walden Univ., LLC, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1324 (D. Or. 2014). 
13 Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 153 (5th Cir. 1961). 
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notice prior to enrollment,14 deceived students into taking out private loans 
that were more expensive than advertised,15 charged increasingly large fees 
on top of tuition in an apparent attempt to obscure the rising cost of college,16 
grossly misrepresented job placement rates,17 and shut down unexpectedly and 
left thousands of students with significant student loan debt and no degrees.18  
 Historically, little recourse has existed for students subjected to such 
treatment. Students who attend public universities may bring a constitutional 
challenge and try to state a claim that meets the high burden required to show 
deficiency in process under the Due Process Clause.19 However, because 
private universities are not always considered state actors bound by the same 
restrictions of the United States Constitution, students at private universities 
often must utilize other causes of action to challenge their treatment: most 
commonly, their claims are framed as contractual disputes alleging breach of 
contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.20 
The assertion of such contractual rights is seen as imposing on private 
 
14 Basch v. George Washington Univ., 370 A.2d 1364, 1365-67 (D.C. 1977). 
15 See Paul Fain, CFPB Penalizes Bridgepoint over Private Loans, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 13, 
2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2016/09/13/cfpb-penalizes-bridgepoint-over-pri
vate-loans [https://perma.cc/3DMC-XTVA] (noting that the owner of Ashford University was ordered 
to pay an $8 million fine and make restitution of $23.5 million to over 1,200 defrauded students). 
16 See Jon Marcus, Graduate Students are Mounting Degrees of Protest over ‘Hidden Fees,’ WASH. 
POST (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/graduate-students-
mounting-degrees-of-protest-over-hidden-fees/2019/08/02/a7f19f3c-b3c8-11e9-8949-5f36ff9
2706e_story.html [https://perma.cc/2BDT-HAUH] (reporting that the total amount of fees charged 
by colleges has more than doubled between 2002 and 2017 and that one department at Baruch 
College charges students an $8,000 “academic excellence fee” for reasons it was reluctant to divulge). 
17 Michael Stratford, Corinthian Closes for Good, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 27, 2015), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/04/27/corinthian-ends-operations-remaining-
campuses-affecting-16000-students [https://perma.cc/J4S7-8278]. 
18 Id. 
19 See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 217 (1985) (alleging “a property interest 
in his continued enrollment” in medical school and arguing that “his dismissal was arbitrary and 
capricious, violat[ed] his ‘substantive due process rights’ guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and entitl[ed] him to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”); see also Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. 
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 79-80 (1978) (stating a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and “alleging, 
among other constitutional violations, that petitioners had not accorded [the student] procedural 
due process prior to her dismissal”). 
20 See, e.g., Hubbard v. Howard Univ., No. 17-2262(RDM), 2018 WL 4539704, at *1 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 21, 2018) (stating that plaintiff “Elyssa Hubbard brings this action for breach of contract and 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Defendant Howard University, alleging 
that the university failed to provide adequate instruction . . .; denied ‘her right to initiate’ and to 
pursue ‘a grade dispute pursuant to’ established grievance procedures; and deprived her of a 
meaningful opportunity to challenge her academic suspension”); Alden v. Georgetown Univ., 734 
A.2d 1103, 1107 (D.C. 1999) (noting that the student “also argues that Georgetown breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to evaluate his academic performance in 
good faith and on the merits, rather than based on factors unrelated to academic performance”). 
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universities by way of the common law the same or similar requirements as 
are imposed on public universities by the Due Process Clause.21 
This Comment argues that the increasing complexity and heightened 
significance of the student-university relationship demands a more effective 
adjudicatory mechanism for student-university disputes than the old 
contract-law model. In light of the rapid increase in the cost and importance 
of a college education, Congress should condition the receipt of federally 
guaranteed student loans, as well as other financing provided under the 
Higher Education Act, upon the provision of satisfactory state administrative 
oversight. If states are enlisted to help the federal government protect 
students’ constitutional rights, universities may be less likely to engage in 
arbitrary and highly detrimental action. 
This Comment aims to examine how contracts came to be the dominant 
cause of action for students to sue their universities and to propose a new 
model of state oversight that would more appropriately strike a balance 
between the rights and interests of students and their universities. Part I 
examines the historical precedent that led to the development of the current 
contract-law model; Part II explores the rapid evolution in the dynamics of 
the student-university relationship and argues that the contract-law model no 
longer serves as a reasonable check on university power; and Part III argues 
that state administrative oversight would relieve courts of the burden of 
dealing with lawsuits in which they cannot reasonably provide relief while 
also better protecting the rights of students. 
I. HISTORY OF THE STUDENT-UNIVERSITY RELATIONSHIP & 
ASCENSION OF THE CONTRACT-LAW MODEL 
The student-university relationship has evolved in tandem with the 
system of higher education, both of which have come a long way from their 
roots in early American history. Higher education in the American colonies 
began as a mostly private enterprise, often sponsored by the church.22 In the 
colonial era, universities were also chartered by the British Crown and by the 
colonies; after the Revolution, the state and the federal government chartered 
their own universities.23 By the middle of the nineteenth century, this 
patchwork of colleges offering training in the classics began to appear 
 
21 See Abbariao v. Hamline Univ. Sch. of Law, 258 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Minn. 1977) (declaring that 
“[t]he requirements imposed by the common law [of contracts] on private universities parallel those 
imposed by the due process clause on public universities”). 
22 Sally M. Furay, Note, Legal Relationship Between the Student and the Private College or 
University, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 244, 247 (1970). 
23 See id. (citing as examples Columbia University, chartered by the Crown; Harvard 
University, chartered by a colony; and George Washington University, chartered by Congress). 
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inadequate to meet the needs of an evolving nation. Amidst struggles to 
assimilate unprecedented numbers of immigrants into a rapidly industrializing 
economic landscape, calls for a revolution in higher education rang out. 
The loudest of those voices to call out for modernization was Charles 
Eliot, the President of Harvard University. In 1869, with the Civil War past 
and the project of nation-building back at the center of American life, Eliot 
published an article in The Atlantic calling for a “New Education” that was to 
be more practical: A father today, he wrote, “will not believe that the same 
methods which trained some boys well for the life of fifty or one hundred 
years ago are applicable to his son” because “the kind of man which he wants his 
son to make did not exist in all the world fifty years ago.”24 Many clamored for 
a more vocationally-focused education, one designed to prepare students for the 
realities of the emerging American economy.25 In response, Eliot proposed a 
system of education based upon “the pure and applied sciences, the living 
European languages, and mathematics” rather than upon the dead classical 
languages that had previously been emphasized.26 This, he believed, would 
ultimately make students “good engineers, manufacturers, architects, chemists, 
merchants, teachers of science, or directors of mines and industrial works.”27 
Even as Eliot worked to transform and modernize the curricula at 
Harvard and its peer institutions, most colleges in the nineteenth century 
continued to entertain relatively modest and transactional relationships with 
their students. To enroll at the University of Michigan, for instance, one had 
only to present a certificate of good character and pay tuition; to graduate 
and receive a degree, one had only to attend “certain courses of lectures 
through two terms of six months each.”28 Indeed, until the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the major universities had no standardized written 
examinations for admission, nor did they require prior knowledge of anything 
other than Greek, Latin, and arithmetic in order to matriculate.29 
 
24 Charles W. Eliot, The New Education, THE ATLANTIC, (Feb. 1869), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1869/02/the-new-education/309049/ [https://perma
.cc/H4YZ-9SPM]. 
25 See generally Joseph F. Kett, “Theory Run Mad”: John Dewey and “Real” Vocational Education, 16 J. 
GILDED AGE & PROGRESSIVE ERA 500, 501-05 (2017) (describing the intellectual development of the 
vocational movement, and John Dewey’s attempt to meld vocational education with general education). 
26 Eliot, supra note 24. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 See id. (noting that Yale’s Chemistry Department required no real exam for admission); see 
also EDWIN CORNELIUS BROOME, A HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF COLLEGE 
ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS 30, 46, 126 (1903) (noting that “no mathematics beyond vulgar 
arithmetic was required for admission to any college” and that not until the end of the nineteenth 
century did Latin, Greek, and arithmetic cease to be the sole requirements for entrance). 
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It was during this period of modernization that the student-university 
relationship was shoehorned into the contract-law model. At its core, this was 
a logical development, since “the elements of a traditional contract are present 
in the implied contract between a college and a student . . . .”30 The student’s 
submission of an application may be seen as an offer; the student’s admission 
may be seen as acceptance by the university; and the payment of a deposit or 
tuition may be seen as valuable consideration.31 Further, the relationship 
between a student and a university was often expressly stated in a written, 
albeit sparse, enrollment contract. Resembling a money-for-services 
agreement, the mutual promises between a university and a student naturally 
seemed to fit into a contract-law model.32 
The relatively unsophisticated, transactional student-university 
relationship of the nineteenth century thus provided the foundation for the 
contract-law model. Unsurprisingly, then, most early suits between students 
and their universities were filed by universities to recover unpaid tuition or 
by students for a tuition refund or to compel conferral of a degree.33 Outside 
of such disputes over tuition payments, which naturally brought to mind 
notions of contract law, universities were considered virtually immune from 
lawsuits; as a former General Counsel for the University of California system 
once noted, the university up until the 1960s was “a citadel where 
administrators governed students virtually unfettered by legal constraints.”34 
By some accounts, the contract-law model was a reasonable fit in an era in 
which the relationship between a student and university was often “expressly 
 
30 Audrey Wolfson Latourette & Robert D. King, Judicial Intervention in the Student-University 
Relationship: Due Process and Contract Theories, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 199, 236 (1988). 
31 Id. 
32 See Jonathan Flagg Buchter, Contract Law and the Student-University Relationship, 48 IND. 
L.J. 253, 253 (1973) (stating that “[u]ntil the early 1900’s, the relationship between the student and 
the institution was expressly stated in a written enrollment contract, which was essentially a business 
agreement between the parent of the student and the institution”). 
33 See Victoria J. Dodd, Non-Contractual Nature of the Student-University Contractual Relationship, 
33 U. KAN. L. REV. 701, 702-03 (1985) (finding that “[m]ost of the earliest American school cases 
utilizing a contract theory arose in limited situations in which a school was suing for unpaid tuition, 
or a student, for a tuition refund”); see also Tr. of Howard Coll. v. Turner, 71 Ala. 429, 430 (1882) 
(action for the recovery of damages from alleged breach of agreement to provide scholarship 
assistance); Blumer Coll. of Natureopathy v. Nelson, 114 A. 115, 115 (Conn. 1921) (action by college 
to compel tuition payment after student attended one class and left the college dissatisfied); Balt. 
Univ. v. Colton, 57 A. 14, 15 (Md. 1904) (action for writ of mandamus to compel award of law degree 
on student who had completed all coursework); Niedermeyer v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 61 Mo. 
App. 654, 656-57 (Ct. App. 1895) (suit for recovery of $10 in excess tuition charged to and paid by a 
law student). 
34 SCOTT M. GELBER, COURTROOMS AND CLASSROOMS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF 
COLLEGE ACCESS, 1860-1960, at 1-2 (2016). 
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stated in a written enrollment contract.”35 In particular, contract law was seen 
as providing to students at private universities some of the same due process 
protections that would eventually be recognized for students at state-
sponsored universities.36 
Indeed, the contract-law model was successful in the limited role it was 
called on to play. Specifically, it has helped students to avoid arbitrary and 
capricious university action in some egregious cases—including some cases in 
the modern era. The case of Johnson v. Lincoln Christian College provides an 
illustrative example. During Gregory Johnson’s last semester at Lincoln 
Christian College in Lincoln, Illinois, another student informed school 
administrators that Johnson “might be homosexual.”37 As a result, the College 
required Johnson to attend private counseling sessions, which Johnson 
believed would be confidential.38 However, the contents of these sessions 
were ultimately disclosed to college administrators.39 The administrators 
subsequently called Johnson’s mother to inform her that her son was being 
dismissed on account of allegations of homosexuality.40 Furthermore, despite 
the fact that Johnson had completed all of his coursework satisfactorily, they 
threatened to stamp the reason for Johnson’s dismissal on his transcript and 
then refused to issue him his diploma.41 The court held that on the basis of 
those facts, Johnson had stated a claim for relief based on a breach of the 
implied contract inherent in every student-university relationship.42 
The case of Russell v. Salve Regina College also demonstrates the success of 
the contract-law model in curbing the most egregious university actions. 
Sharon Russell was well on her way to a nursing degree at Salve Regina 
College in Newport, Rhode Island when she began to suffer numerous 
indignities and slights as an obese person.43 There was the “agonizing search 
for uniforms and scrub gowns that would fit a woman of Russell’s girth” as 
 
35 Buchter, supra note 32, at 253. But see Latourette & King, supra note 30, at 231-32 (arguing 
that over time “the contract theory in student-university disputes has not afforded students 
significant protection of individual rights” because suits relying on the contract theory “almost 
uniformly resulted in affirmation of the university action”). 
36 See Latourette & King, supra note 30, at 230-31 (stating that students at private universities 
“rely on . . . contract law to challenge university actions perceived as abusive of institutional 
discretion” by utilizing the “vehicle of contract law” to “achieve many of the same due process 
concepts and protections afforded their state counterparts”). 
37 Johnson v. Lincoln Christian Coll., 501 N.E.2d 1380, 1382 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 1383. 
40 Id. at 1382. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1384 (concluding that “Johnson’s complaint states a valid cause of action for breach of 
an implied contract between Johnson and LCC, and the trial court erred in dismissing count I of 
the complaint”). 
43 Russell v. Salve Regina Coll., 649 F. Supp. 391, 395 (D.R.I. 1986). 
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well as “a tendency on the part of faculty members to employ Russell . . . to 
model hospital procedures incident to the care of obese patients” and 
“prolonged lectures and discussions about the desirability of weight loss.”44 
Ultimately, she was dismissed from Salve Regina College’s nursing program 
because, in her words, she didn’t conform to the “Salve image.”45 Even more 
humiliating, the Court seemed to delight in mocking the situation. “The 
problems presented by this lawsuit are weighty in every sense of the word,” 
wrote the Court.46 More cringeworthy puns followed: “[C]ontagion was not 
legitimately at issue—after all, there is no allegation of communicable 
corpulence here” and “evidence . . . tends to show that Russell’s girth did not 
reduce her proficiency.”47 Ultimately, though, the Court sided with Russell, 
allowing her claim to move past the summary judgment stage: “Faced with 
contrary opinions from qualified health care professionals and particularized 
allegations of personal animosity born of obesophobic obsession, this issue, 
viewed in the manner most hospitable to the plaintiff ’s case, survives 
[summary judgment].”48 
Successful lawsuits like Russell’s and Johnson’s, which seemed to suggest 
courts were willing to act as a check on arbitrary university action, are proof 
that students may at times prevail under the contract-law model.49 However, 
despite the fact that students seldom obtain relief from suits sounding in 
contract, the language of contracts nevertheless has aided litigants by allowing 
them to frame issues in a manner that gradually became “familiar to the 
court”; in doing so, litigants can “cloak[]” their actions “in the mantle of 
precedent.”50 Further, some scholars argued that the judiciary was and 
remains uniquely well suited to use the language of contracts—particularly 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing—to appropriately balance 
rights and develop constitutional standards; in turn, it was suggested, the 
university would benefit from the “gentle guidance of the courts to evolve 
clearer standards of procedures and more codified concepts of academic 
custom and usage.”51 Unfortunately, history shows that no such standards ever 
 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 406 (internal quotations omitted). 
46 Id. at 407. 
47 Id. at 405-06. 
48 Id. at 406-07. 
49 Indeed, it has always been technically possible for students to prevail in contract disputes 
with their universities. See, e.g., Balt. Univ. v. Colton, 57 A. 14, 17 (Md. 1904) (holding that a law 
student could seek a writ of mandamus compelling his university to confer a degree on him after he 
was arbitrarily denied one). The issue is rather whether the scales of justice are properly balanced 
such that a meritorious case can typically succeed. 
50 Robert Faulkner, Judicial Deference to University Decisions Not to Grant Degrees, Certificates, and 
Credit—the Fiduciary Alternative, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 837, 851 (1989). 
51 Virginia Davis Nordin, The Contract to Educate: Toward a More Workable Theory of the Student-
University Relationship, 8 J.C. & U.L. 141, 148 (1981). 
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evolved out of judges’ application of the contract-law model, and it remains 
very difficult for students to prevail against their universities. 
II. CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES & CALL FOR REFORM 
While a handful of cases like Russell and Johnson seem to suggest that the 
contract-law model is an appropriate scale on which to balance the rights of 
students and their universities, seismic social and economic changes in the 
second half of twentieth century vastly altered the landscape of American 
higher education, triggering an explosion of new lawsuits and leaving 
successful plaintiffs like Sharon Russell and Gregory Johnson the exception 
rather than the norm. 
To understand how this occurred, it is necessary to trace the rapid 
evolution of the educational landscape over the last century. At the conclusion 
of World War II, with Europe in ruins, the United States stood atop the world 
in economic and military power. The United States at that time produced two 
times more petroleum than the rest of the world combined, had a near global 
monopoly on the burgeoning aerospace and electronics industries, and 
retained two-thirds of the world’s gold and half of all its monetary reserves.52 
Over the next twenty-five years, the American economy generated over 
twenty million new jobs and the size of the middle class doubled—an 
“unprecedented achievement[] for any modern society.”53 
This economic miracle led to what one historian has called the “most 
significant development in the history of American education.”54 Specifically, 
the extraordinary postwar economic expansion, along with the GI Bill, 
propelled the development of the modern university and boosted enrollment: 
more than twice the number of Americans received college degrees in 1950 
than had received degrees just ten years earlier.55 Colleges ceased to be 
“villages with priests” and became “impersonal and bureaucratic ‘multi-
versities.’”56 By 1948, ten universities had enrolled at least 20,000 students.57 
Then, between 1961 and 1991, as the Baby Boomers came of age, the number 
of college students increased from “‘just over’ 4.1 million . . . to almost 14.2 
 
52 DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION 
AND WAR, 1929–1945, at 856-57 (1999). 
53 Id. at 857. 
54 JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945–1974, at 
68-69 (1996). 
55 See id. (noting that in 1940, only 216,500 Americans received college degrees, but that in 
1950, approximately 497,000 of them did). 
56 Id. at 69; see also House Hearing, supra note 1, at 32 (statement of Mary Frances McCourt) 
(noting that the Indiana University system enrolls over 100,000 students and has an annual operating 
budget that exceeds $3.3 billion). 
57 PATTERSON, supra note 54, at 69. 
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million,” while the number of colleges and universities in the United States 
between 1960 and 1990 increased by more than 50% in response to the 
increased demand for higher education.58 However, a 50% increase in the 
number of colleges by 1990 was unable to keep pace with the 346% increase 
in the number of college students by 1991. 
Such profound changes in the demand for higher education transformed 
the educational marketplace, resulting in skyrocketing tuition fees, the rapid 
growth of endowments and operating budgets, and the marketing of college 
as an experience rather than just an educational opportunity. First, tuition 
rose drastically in the second half of the twentieth century and into the 
twenty-first century, climbing by some estimates 1,200% over the last forty 
years.59 Today, sticker prices for many private colleges regularly exceed 
$50,000 a year, and are approaching $70,000 in some cases.60 For many 
American families, one of “the biggest financial challenges in modern 
life . . . is[] figuring out how to pay for the cost of college.”61 To compete for 
students willing to pay such fees, colleges over the last thirty years 
dramatically increased the size of their administrative staff and “engaged in 
an ‘arms race’ with each other to build things like movie theaters and luxury 
gyms.”62 While steep increases in college tuition might suggest that 
universities are struggling to cover their increased expenditures, this appears 
 
58 Hazel Glenn Beh, Student versus University: The University’s Implied Obligations of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing, 59 MD. L. REV. 183, 187 (2000). 
59 See House Hearing, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Chairman Peter Roskam) (stating that the 
1,200% increase in tuition over the last forty years eclipses even the breathtaking pace of inflation in 
healthcare costs). But see Nick Anderson, Attention, College Shoppers. These Schools are Slashing their 
Prices, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/attention-
college-shoppers-these-schools-are-slashing-their-prices/2019/01/21/e384eca0-12bc-11e9-90a8-
136fa44b80ba_story.html?utm_term=.a0f48dad6a76 [https://perma.cc/QCS9-L8A5] (suggesting 
that tuition increases may have plateaued, as some colleges are now reducing tuition to attract 
students in a more competitive marketplace). 
60 See Average Published Undergraduate Charges by Sector and by Carnegie Classification, 2018-19, 
COLLEGE BD., https://trends.collegeboard.org/college-pricing/figures-tables/average-published-
undergraduate-charges-sector-2018-19 [https://perma.cc/7GUW-NB35] (showing that the average 
yearly cost of a four-year private college is $48,510); Farran Powell & Emma Kerr, See the Average 
College Tuition in 2019-2020, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 9, 2019), 
https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/paying-for-college/articles/paying-for-college-
infographic [https://perma.cc/L8BB-LE28] (reporting that more than 100 private colleges in the 
United States charge more than $50,000 a year); Ron Lieber, Why It’s So Hard to Calculate What You’ll 
Pay for College, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/19/your-
money/paying-for-college.html [https://perma.cc/BC4H-PBNQ] (noting that among elite private 
schools in New England, such as Smith, Wellesley, and Mount Holyoke, the list price of a year of 
tuition approaches $70,000). 
61 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Chairman Peter Roskam). 
62 Id. at 4; see also Beh, supra note 58, at 187 (claiming that “[t]he proliferation of colleges means 
that . . . colleges must actively market themselves to stand apart and can no longer simply wait for 
student applications.”). 
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not to be the case: as of 2013, more than 90 colleges and universities had 
endowments valued above one billion dollars and more than 40 college 
presidents were being paid more than a million dollars a year—largely to 
conduct fundraising to grow their endowments even further.63 
Accompanying these rapid shifts in the economic landscape of American 
higher education was an uptick in the gatekeeping role of universities. In the 
decades following World War II, the United States economy shifted its focus 
from manufacturing to services, from blue collar work to white collar work. 
At the same time, people increasingly turned to colleges and universities to 
provide the training necessary to gain access to the new jobs in the American 
economy.64 Today, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, workers with 
bachelor’s degrees make almost twice what workers with only a high school 
diploma make; and workers with professional degrees make almost three 
times what their counterparts with only a high school diploma make.65 
Education, as one journalist has noted, “is the best way to cross class barriers,” 
but given the high cost of college, “in many cases, education seems to be the 
barrier.”66 As the Fifth Circuit pointed out, “[i]t requires no argument to 
demonstrate that education is vital” to ensure that citizens would be able “to 
earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, [and] to fulfill as 
completely as possible the duties and responsibilities of good citizens.”67 
In light of the increasing cost and significance of a college education, it is 
not surprising that lawsuits seeking to vindicate student rights proliferated 
in the latter half of the twentieth century. The increase in litigation was aided 
by the landmark decision of the Fifth Circuit in Dixon v. Alabama State Board 
of Education, which was brought following the dismissal of African-American 
students for disciplinary reasons—subsequently revealed to be a request for 
service at a whites-only lunch counter on campus.68 The Circuit, noting that it 
 
63 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Chairman Peter Roskam). See also Greeley 
Myers, University Presidents and the Role of Fundraising at Private Liberal Arts Universities at 1 
(May 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Walden University) (on file with author) (finding that 
“many university presidents view fundraising as a primary responsibility in their jobs” and “many 
struggle to balance fundraising with other challenging demands”). 
64 Faulkner, supra note 50, at 845 (noting that like banks and insurance companies, “colleges 
offer a service without which the student could not accomplish certain important goals” and from 
which the modern student expects “a substantial return, usually in the form of knowledge, prestige, 
and employment”). 
65  See Elka Torpey, Measuring the Value of Education, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Apr. 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2018/data-on-display/education-pays.htm [https://perma.cc/
G5MF-ZQDY] (demonstrating that in a work week a person can expect to earn $712 with a high 
school diploma, $1,173 with a bachelor’s degree, and $1,836 with a professional degree). 
66 This American Life: Three Miles, CHICAGO PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 13, 2015), available online 
at https://www.thisamericanlife.org/550/transcript [https://perma.cc/ZP7E-3HW5] (emphasis added). 
67 Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Ed., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961). 
68 Id. at 152-53, n.3 (5th Cir. 1961). 
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was unconscionable to deny to students “the protection[s] given to a pickpocket,” 
held that state universities are an arm of the state and that public school students 
therefore must be afforded the protections of procedural due process.69 
The surge in legal disputes following Dixon can be seen as a natural 
outgrowth of the rights consciousness of the era. During the 1960s, the 
African-American Civil Rights Movement, the Women’s Movement, the Gay 
Rights Movement, and the Anti-War Movement catalyzed a revolution in 
individual rights pushed both from the bottom-up by student groups and 
from the top-down by lawmakers. These battles, fought largely in the courts 
and in the legislatures, were replicated by students seeking greater 
accountability and more protection.70 Indeed, according to one survey, over 
90% of college suits reported prior to the year 2010 were brought after 1969, 
in the wake of Dixon and at the height of the era of rights-consciousness.71 
This change goes to show that students who invest significant sums of money 
may reasonably expect accountability. Consequently, they have asked courts 
to hold their universities responsible for providing inaccurate information 
about degree requirements,72 for cancelling courses,73 for cancelling programs 
of study,74 for arbitrary admissions policies,75 for unpredictably large increases 
in tuition,76 and for bait-and-switch tactics in which universities reneged on 
promises not to raise fees for the duration of study.77 
As lawsuits brought by students against their universities proliferated in 
the midst of the revolution in rights-consciousness and in the wake of Dixon, 
 
69 Id. at 158 (noting that it is shocking that “officials of a state educational institution” do not 
“understand the elementary principles of fair play” and holding that “fundamental constitutional 
principle[s] support [its] holding that due process requires notice and some opportunity for hearing 
before a student at a tax-supported college is expelled for misconduct”). 
70 See PATTERSON, supra note 54, at 568 (arguing that a “major trend[] of the era” was “the 
rise of rights-consciousness,” which was imbued with “special urgency” by the civil rights movement, 
and which culminated in a “near-irresistible” drive for the expansion of individual rights); see also 
Elizabeth L. Grossi & Terry D. Edwards, Student Misconduct: Historical Trends in Legislative and 
Judicial Decision-Making in American Universities, 23 J.C. & U.L. 829, 834 (1997) (noting that 
“[i]ndividual rights were fast becoming a major issue for society-at-large, and students on U.S. 
college and university campuses sought expansion of their rights through actions on campus and in 
courts of law”). 
71 GELBER, supra note 34, at 2. 
72 Olsson v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 402 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (N.Y. 1980). 
73 Zumbrun v. Univ. of S. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 502 (Ct. App. 1972). 
74 Eden v. State, 103 Misc. 2d 461, 462-63 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1980). 
75 Steinberg v. Chicago Med. Sch., 371 N.E.2d 634, 638-39 (Ill. 1977). 
76 Basch v. George Washington Univ., 370 A.2d 1364, 1365-66 (D.C. 1977); see also Kevin Stone, 
Brnovich Wants Arizona Supreme Court to Hear Tuition Case Appeal, KTAR NEWS (Jan. 29, 2019, 4:34 
PM), http://ktar.com/story/2417554/brnovich-wants-arizona-supreme-court-to-hear-tuition-case-
appeal/ [https://perma.cc/44AU-JL42] (describing a suit brought by Arizona’s Attorney General alleging 
the 300% increase in state university tuition over a 15-year period violated Arizona’s constitution). 
77 Kashmiri v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 635, 638-39 (Ct. App. 2007). 
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scholars, courts, and students began to confront contract law’s inability to 
provide meaningful relief in the context of the student-university relationship. 
First, while contract principles were “developed to adjudicate disputes 
between commercial interests,” by the late 1960s this characterization no 
longer accurately described the student-university relationship.78 Indeed, it is not 
clear that students today understand they are even creating a contract by enrolling 
in college, which makes it difficult to bargain for terms or to understand fully the 
reasonable expectations that each party should have of the other.79 
Second, student-university contracts are contracts of adhesion, which at 
their worst can be deceptive and oppressive.80 More problematic, many courts 
are unwilling to treat the student-university contract as unconscionable 
contracts of adhesion,81 which would require them to, among other things, 
scrutinize the contract with more rigor and construe ambiguous terms against 
the party that drafted the terms.82 
 
78 Buchter, supra note 32, at 262. 
79 See id. at 263 (noting that courts have upheld waiver clauses and other catalogue provisions 
despite “no finding that [such clauses or provisions] had been read or understood as binding by a 
reasonable student”); see also Dodd, supra note 33, at 714 (stating that many universities, failing to 
understand that their brochures and bulletins will constitute contractual language in the event that 
litigation ensues, enlist university administrators rather than lawyers to draft their materials). This 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that the universities can change their bulletins and brochures 
yearly and without notice. See id. at 714-15, 728 (noting that this creates even more uncertainty in 
the student-university relationship). 
80 See, e.g., Schnuerle v. Insight Commc’ns Co., 376 S.W.3d 561, 575-76 (Ky. 2012) (stating that 
adhesion contracts are not “per se improper” because they can “significantly reduc[e] transaction 
costs in many situations,” but noting that they can also be “one-sided, oppressive and unfairly 
surprising contracts”); see also Ilan v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 632 F. Supp. 886, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (noting that courts will not enforce contracts of adhesion that are “unduly oppressive, 
unconscionable, or against public policy”). 
81 See, e.g., Wagner v. Holtzapple, 101 F. Supp. 3d 462, 477 n.4 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (rejecting 
“counsel’s argument that the [university] handbook amounts to a contract of adhesion” since 
“[a]ttending a university and agreeing to a reasonable code of conduct as outlined by its handbook 
is not what the doctrine of adhesion contracts had contemplated”); Eisele v. Ayers, 381 N.E.2d 21, 
24-25, 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that their contracts with Northwestern 
University were contracts of adhesion, even though the university unilaterally imposed a 57.6% year-
to-year tuition increase—an increase seven times larger than the past average tuition increases—and 
left the students with no ability to negotiate or contest the increase); Newland v. AEC S. Ohio Coll. 
L.L.C., 47 N.E.3d 231, 232 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016) (overruling trial court’s determination that a 
student-university contract containing an arbitration clause was unconscionable). 
82 See Thompson v. Lithia ND Acquisition Corp. #1, 896 N.W.2d 230, 236 (N.D. 2017) (stating 
that courts must examine a contract of adhesion “with special scrutiny to assure that it is not applied 
in an unfair or unconscionable manner against the party who did not participate in its drafting”) 
(quoting Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 693 N.W.2d 918, 924 (N.D. 2005)); Brown v. Genesis 
Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d 217, 228 (W. Va. 2012) (noting that “[a] contract of adhesion should 
receive greater scrutiny than a contract with bargained-for terms to determine if it imposes terms 
that are oppressive, unconscionable or beyond the reasonable expectations of an ordinary person.”); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating that “[i]n 
choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning 
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Third, contracts exist to provide security to private parties that neither 
will commit a material breach of an agreement, but in practice courts construe 
the student-university contract to forbid only egregious or outrageous breach 
as opposed to material breach.83 For example, when Sung Park was dismissed 
from the Indiana University School of Dentistry, Park brought suit alleging 
that the school violated the student-university contract by failing to follow 
the dismissal procedures outlined in the school’s own handbooks.84 The 
Seventh Circuit concluded that even if the school did fail to follow its own 
procedures, that would not automatically lead to a finding of breach since 
“Indiana courts have taken a flexible approach to the scope of contractual 
promises between students and universities” in which “hornbook rules cannot 
be applied mechanically where the principal is an educational institution.”85 
Finally, such contracts are frequently governed by the doctrine of 
academic deference, under which the judiciary exhibits a reluctance to 
interfere in the affairs of private institutions of higher education.86 As one 
court explained, academic deference is desirable because judicial interference 
would cause colleges to become too standardized and would undermine the 
“special aura” that “distinguishes” one college from the next—which often is 
the very reason a certain college is “selected by parents and students.”87 One 
doubts, however, that the “special aura” of a university includes any of the 
following decisions in which courts have refused to scrutinize university 
decision-making: when degree requirements are changed after satisfactory 
completion of a program of study;88 when a comprehensive exam is 
administered improperly;89 when the school’s catalog is silent or ambiguous 
 
is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a 
writing otherwise proceeds”). 
83 See 23 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 63:3 (4th ed. 2007) (stating that courts define “‘breach of contract’ as a ‘material 
failure of performance’ of a duty arising under or imposed by an agreement”); see also Dodd, supra 
note 33, at 708 (arguing that education cases “set a very high standard for a breach of contract, higher 
than in other contexts”). 
84 Sung Park v. Ind. Univ. Sch. of Dentistry, 692 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 2012). 
85 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
86 See, e.g., Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978) (stating 
that “[l]ike the decision of an individual professor as to the proper grade for a student in his course, 
the determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation 
of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or 
administrative decisionmaking” and declining “to further enlarge the judicial presence in the 
academic community”). 
87 Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 581-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) 
(quoting Schulman v. Franklin and Marshall Coll., 538 A.2d 49, 52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)). 
88 Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 401 F. Supp. 381, 382-83 (N.D. Ga. 1975), rev’d, 529 F.2d 448 
(5th Cir. 1976). 
89 Tanner v. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ill., 459 N.E.2d 324, 325-27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). 
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about degree requirements;90 or when a student is expelled for having mental 
health problems91 or for being gay.92 As a result, students who may have 
invested tens of thousands of dollars may be left unable to graduate or secure 
employment in the field of their choice. Academic deference thus compounds 
the difficulty of securing relief following a material breach of a university’s 
non-administrative decisions; indeed, it makes it nearly impossible for 
students to prevail against their universities in court.93 While courts remain 
free to suggest more procedural protections for students—such as, in the 
context of disciplinary proceedings, the use of an impartial decisionmaker, 
the provision of notice of allegations, or the requirement of an opportunity 
to be heard—they seldom impose such protections.94 
Aside from overarching doctrinal limitations, there are also practical 
limitations to using the law of contracts as a cause of action. First, unlike in 
the early twentieth century, in today’s student-university suits there is seldom 
a single written instrument that contains all the terms of a contract.95 As a 
result, courts are placed in the unfortunate position of assuming the terms of 
a contract rather than requiring the parties to prove the terms of the 
contract.96 More problematically, courts accept that any of the publications of 
a university or college may contain the express—though not the exclusive—
terms of a contract between the student and the university.97 It is doubtful, as 
 
90 Blank v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 273 N.Y.S.2d 796, 801-03 (Spec. Term 1966). 
91 See Aronson v. N. Park Coll., 418 N.E.2d 776, 777-78, 782 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (reversing a 
jury award of $22,321.60 for a student dismissed at the end of her first semester of college after she 
was deemed to be a chronic paranoid). 
92 Lexington Theological Seminary, Inc. v. Vance, 596 S.W.2d 11, 11-12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) 
(regarding a student who was dismissed after conclusion of all studies required for graduation 
because his admission of homosexuality was found to have violated the student handbook’s desirable 
personality traits clause). 
93 Nordin, supra note 51, at 168 (arguing that “[t]he judicial attitude which states its diffidence 
in deciding academic matters is in strong contrast to the judicial attitude which weighs complex fact 
situations in medical malpractice, anti-trust, patent or tax cases”). 
94 See, e.g., A. v. C. Coll., 863 F. Supp. 156, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (identifying procedures that 
would help to minimize the need for judicial intervention in disciplinary matters without requiring 
their adoption). 
95 See, e.g., Guckenberger v. Bos. Univ., 974 F. Supp. 106, 150 (D. Mass. 1997) (“Under 
Massachusetts law, the promise, offer, or commitment that forms the basis of a valid contract can be 
derived from statements in handbooks, policy manuals, brochures, catalogs, advertisements, and 
other promotional materials”); see also Scott R. Sinson, Judicial Intervention of Private University 
Expulsions: Traditional Remedies and a Solution Sounding in Tort, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 208-09 (1997) 
(stating that the terms of the student-university contract can be derived from “catalogues and 
manuals, bulletins, registration forms and other institutional documents”). 
96 See, e.g., Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1305 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that “[c]ontract 
theory is not wholly satisfactory, however, because the essentially fictional nature of the contract 
results in its generally being assumed rather than proved . . . .”). 
97 See, e.g., Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060, 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (accepting that the 
bulletins and catalogue of the university contained the terms of the student-university contract). 
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some judges have noted, that students understand that publications or 
marketing materials like college catalogs and bulletins are binding and can be 
used to construe the terms of a contract.98 Even if students did understand 
the binding power of these documents, it is even more doubtful that they 
would have any power to bargain their way out of what are essentially 
contracts of adhesion. Finally, because contracts are matters of state law, 
students that apply to universities in multiple states are unlikely to comprehend 
how their rights or their obligations might differ from state-to-state.99 
III. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL IN ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT 
Under a contract-law model that allows students to file a claim but seldom 
permits them to obtain relief, universities have little incentive to reform 
themselves. If change is to occur, it must occur due to outside pressures.100 
Though the pressures of the market might eventually lead to change, 
government oversight provides a more intentional path forward. Further, 
oversight would not be a new phenomenon in higher education; in fact, since 
at least the 1960s, the federal government has recognized the need for 
congressional oversight of higher education.101 Historically, both Republican 
and Democratic administrations and Congresses have enacted regulations to 
protect taxpayer investments in higher education and to prevent the arbitrary 
or even “predatory” behavior of universities receiving federal funds or federal 
support.102 In a recent Senate hearing, members of both major political parties 
recognized the need for reform. Senator Patty Murray, a Democrat 
representing Washington, argued for more oversight to require that colleges 
disclose, among other data points, employment outcomes and average student 
debt.103 On the other side of the aisle, Senator Lamar Alexander, a Republican 
 
98 See, e.g., Ryan v. Hofstra Univ., 324 N.Y.S.2d 964, 973-74 (Spec. Term 1971) (noting the 
difficulty of proving that students or their parents understood catalogs and other university 
publications as contractual terms). 
99 See, e.g., Hux v. S. Methodist Univ., 819 F.3d 776, 781-82 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting that some 
states, such as Texas, don’t recognize a “contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing” in the 
student-university relationship, which leaves students at some private universities without the full 
range of protections typically afforded by the due process clause and contract law). 
100 See House Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Chairman Peter Roskam) (submitting “that 
higher education is not likely to reform itself ” without external pressures). 
101 See Beh, supra note 58, at 194 (arguing that the Student Right To Know Provisions of the 
Higher Education Act demonstrate “congressional recognition that higher education is both a 
product and a relationship that begs for external review”). 
102 Spiros Protopsaltis & Libby Masiuk, Protecting Students and Taxpayers: Why the Trump 
Administration Should Heed History of Bipartisan Efforts, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, 
at 1 (Dec. 1, 2017). 
103 Recalibrating Regulation of Colleges and Universities: A Report from the Task Force on Government 
Regulation of Higher Education: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 
114th Cong. 5 (2015) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of Sen. Patty Murray) (contending that 
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representing Tennessee and a former United States Secretary of Education, 
agreed that taxpayers deserved better regulations and argued that “neither 
colleges nor students” were “well served by the jungle” of regulations that 
then existed.104 While there is a history of bipartisanship in this area, it is also 
clear that the current state of oversight is bleak and only getting bleaker as 
the Trump Administration seeks to dismantle what is left of the federal 
regulatory functions of the United States Department of Education that aim 
to hold universities accountable.105 
While education has historically been a matter of state policy, the federal 
government has been increasingly involved in education, and particularly in 
higher education. The Higher Education Act of 1965, which governs the 
federal regulatory scheme for universities, is almost 1,000 pages long, and 
there are more than 1,000 more pages in the Code of Federal Regulations that 
work in tandem with the Act.106 Today, federal aid programs provide credit 
for about 90% of all student loans in the United States and the federal 
government invests $241.3 billion annually into financial aid for higher 
education.107 The disbursement of such immense financial support by the 
federal government arguably provides both the legal and moral justification 
for additional oversight. Thankfully, Congress need not start from scratch in 
crafting a more effective regulatory scheme, as some models for effective 
oversight already exist. 
The most promising of all prior oversight mechanisms were the State 
Postsecondary Review Entities (SPREs) established as part of the 1992 
reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. Under the reauthorization, each 
state was required to create an SPRE to improve consumer protection with 
stronger oversight and investigatory functions.108 The animating feature of 
the SPREs was to be the strengthening of the so-called “triad” of higher 
 
“[w]hen students are deciding where to attend, they should have the tools to find out if their college 
or university will give them a good return on their investment and hard work.”). 
104 Id. (statement of Sen. Lamar Alexander, Chairman, S. Comm. On Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions). 
105 See Protopsaltis & Masiuk, supra note 102, at 2 (critiquing the Trump Administration’s 2017 
plan to undermine two Obama Administration rules that allowed the Secretary of Education to 
“discharge the loans of borrowers who were . . . mistreated by their schools” and required universities 
to disclose college performance data to help college applicants decide which college to attend). 
106 Senate Hearing, supra note 103 (statement of Sen. Lamar Alexander). 
107 House Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of David Lucca); see also COLLEGE BD., TRENDS IN 
STUDENT AID 2018 9, 16, https://research.collegeboard.org/pdf/trends-student-aid-2018-full-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5GN-YPWT] (noting that in the 2017-18 academic year, students 
received over $200 billion in financial aid from the federal government through Pell Grants, federal 
student loans, the GI Bill, tax benefits, and other mechanisms). 
108 Protopsaltis & Masiuk, supra note 102, at 5. 
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education oversight.109 The higher education regulatory triad is composed of 
state agencies, which are responsible for protecting consumers; accreditors, 
which are responsible for ensuring the quality of education; and the federal 
government, which is responsible for providing the financial aid to boost 
access to higher education.110 By requiring states to create new oversight 
agencies, the 1992 revisions to the Higher Education Act sought to leverage 
the power of the states to complement the federal government’s efforts and 
the work of the educational accrediting agencies.111 Under this new model, 
SPREs would be responsible for establishing stricter requirements to ensure 
accountability, transparency, and adequate performance. Unfortunately, the 
SPREs were never fully implemented, as Newt Gingrich’s Congress quickly 
moved to trim the regulatory state after Republicans won the House in the 
1994 midterm elections and implemented their Contract with America.112 
Only two states were able to actually create new regulatory bodies to provide 
oversight before Congress, in an effort to eradicate programs that were 
“poorly focused and overly burdensome,” eliminated federal funding.113 
While the political zeitgeist largely accounts for the failure of SPREs to 
materialize, there were also structural concerns voiced at the time that hold 
lessons for today’s reformers who seek to create more accountability, less 
waste, and more effective education for American students. The SPREs were 
sold to state governors and legislatures as a new partnership between state 
and federal government on higher education. Despite this promise, the 
federal government in reality dominated the regulatory scheme. By 
essentially dictating to each state the criteria that would trigger review, the 
federal government left little room for states to maneuver to account for the 
great variance in the quality and kind of higher education offered in different 
states across the nation.114 As a result, the program ceased to function as a 
precise tool that could curtail specific kinds of problematic behavior and 
instead became a blunt tool that regulated all of higher education in a 
 
109 Terese Rainwater, The Rise and Fall of SPRE: A Look at Failed Efforts to Regulate Postsecondary 
Education in the 1990s, 2 AM. ACAD. 107, 108 (2006) (noting that SPREs were created in the context of a 
“weak” triad, with the goal of strengthening state oversight in partnership with federal regulators). 
110 Paul Fain, Obama Administration Leans on State Agencies to Tighten Up Oversight of For-Profits, 
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 4, 2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/03/04/
obama-administration-leans-state-agencies-tighten-oversight-profits [https://perma.cc/99QH-GZ9R]. 
111 Rainwater, supra note 109, at 108. 
112 Id. at 111-12; see Dan Balz, This Midterm Election is Like No Other in a Generation, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 4, 2018, 3:03 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/this-midterm-election-is-
like-no-other-in-a-generation/2018/11/04/dd92e236-df9d-11e8-85df-7a6b4d25cfbb_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/K5LT-QARX] (“In 1994. . . . [a]fter 40 years of Democratic rule in the House, 
Republicans led by soon-to-be-speaker Newt Gingrich swept to power on a tide of anti-
government sentiment.”). 
113 H.R. REP. NO. 104-120, at 75 (1995). 
114 Rainwater, supra note 109, at 111-113. 
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standardized, top-down manner. Choices about how to structure agencies 
have important consequences, as scholar Terry M. Moe has said, “for the 
content and direction of policy.”115 To “make choices about structure, [political 
actors] are implicitly making choices about policy.”116 In choosing to retain a 
dominant position for itself and to exhaustively enumerate by statute the kinds 
of university decisions that would trigger state review, Congress dictated the 
precise policy of oversight, which made the program unpopular with states and 
universities, leaving it open to political attack, which soon followed.117 
Nevertheless, SPREs as a model held great promise, and with some 
modifications could serve as an ideal path forward. Congress could, as it did 
before, require that states create a review entity like the old SPREs in 
exchange for federal financing. However, rather than impose strict, one-size-
fits-all requirements on states, Congress could allow each state to provide 
oversight in a manner that is customized to the needs of the state but that 
meets a few baseline requirements. In other words, it may be preferable to 
provide broad legislation that allows states to hire experts who can “fill in the 
details” and make changes in light of their experience.118 
Specifically, each state should be required to act in an enforcement 
capacity and a benchmarking capacity. State agencies could promulgate 
standards for the universities in their jurisdiction, and encourage 
enforcement under either a private attorney general model or, if funding 
allows, a public enforcement model. Each state should also be required to 
provide a performance-based and outcome-based system that is transparent, 
publicly accountable, and benchmarked. Such a system would help 
prospective students learn how a school performs across educational metrics 
and to learn how a school’s students perform in the job market after 
graduation. This information, if made transparent and benchmarked, would 
allow students to more accurately assess whether the value of a given 
institution merits the cost of enrollment. Further, this system would allow 
students and their parents to see how each university is different, and to allow 
each state to see how it compares to other states in educational outcomes and 
the handling of grievances. Such a system could help to curb both the abuses 
 
115 Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 
267, 268 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson, eds., 1989). 
116 Id. 
117 Jim Zook, Offi cials Eye Plan to Curtail State Oversight Boards, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 
17, 1995), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Officials-Eye-Plan-to-Curtail/84864 [https://perma
.cc/3ZXZ-YU2D] (noting that college leaders have heavily criticized SPREs); Scott Jaschik, Congress 
Moves to Eliminate Aid-Monitoring Agencies, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 26, 1995) 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Congress-Moves-to-Eliminate/85843 [https://perma.cc/9ZF8-
9WY7] (reporting that college officials distressed by the federal intrusion into higher education 
policy met with politicians to advocate for dismantling the system). 
118 Moe, supra note 115, at 270-71. 
 
242 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 223 
that currently end up being adjudicated in court under due process or contract 
theories and the systemic problems with for-profit proprietary universities 
that have defrauded thousands of students in recent years.119 
While regulated institutions typically balk at additional regulation, a new 
regulatory scheme at least would not impose additional burdens on the courts. 
New state agencies could quickly accrue expertise in handling enforcement 
actions and overseeing adjudication, and courts could then safely be required 
to defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of any new regulations or 
requirements that might be imposed. Such an arrangement would likely be 
well received by the courts, as it would help to control their dockets as much 
as the doctrine of academic deference has in the past, but with the added 
benefit of giving more students a better chance of vindicating their rights. 
There are of course some problems with allowing such customization at 
the state level. As is often true in a federalist system, some states may not 
wish to provide much meaningful oversight, leaving students in those states 
with a less robust system. Further, since students often apply to colleges in 
many states, it may make it difficult for students to really shop for colleges 
across state lines and easily compare the performance and culture of, say, a 
university in Louisiana with the performance and culture of a university in 
Montana. While a state-by-state system is certainly not a panacea for all the 
ills of higher education, it still would go some way toward smoothing out the 
differences that currently exist in the judge-made realm of contract law. 
However, such a tapestry of divergent state practices can also be a benefit, 
as states may operate as laboratories of democracy to innovate and find more 
cost-effective and efficient mechanisms for oversight. Additionally, as 
Heather Gerken points out, “[s]tate and local governments have become sites 
of empowerment for racial minorities and dissenters” who “can wield more 
electoral power at the local level than they do at the national.”120 Thus, 
incorporating state oversight can add a progressive bent to federalist 
structures. Further, promoting an actual partnership between state and 
federal government would allow the United States Department of Education 
to continue its oversight capacities while also providing many more sets of 
watchful eyes at the state level to complement federal oversight. 
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Management Corporation falsely certified that it was in compliance with Title VI of the HEA in 
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students they enrolled.”). 
120 Heather Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, DEMOCRACY, Spring 2012, https://democracy
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Thus, despite the drawbacks, there is much to be gained from requiring 
states to create oversight mechanisms and from allowing states to do this 
important work in individually tailored ways. 
CONCLUSION 
Students have been suing their universities for well over a century under 
different causes of action. Appropriately, in an era when higher education was 
typically seen as a market transaction in which tuition was exchanged for 
access to lectures and conferral of a degree, the law of contracts came to be 
the primary vehicle for such lawsuits. Since that time, the nature of the 
student-university relationship has changed significantly. As a degree from a 
university has increasingly become a prerequisite for access to the American 
labor market, and as tuition has skyrocketed, universities have become 
powerful institutions in American life on which students are dependent and 
against which students are relatively powerless. As a result, scholars and 
observers have called for a more robust use of contract law to level the playing 
field between students and universities when legal disputes arise. 
Scholars are right to note that the common law has been too slow to adapt 
to the rapidly changing landscape that provides the context for the student-
university relationship. However, even if student-university contracts began 
to be treated as the contracts of adhesion that they most represent, or even if 
courts began to recognize that the duty of good faith and fair dealing requires 
them to create and abide by clear and fair codes of conduct, contract law 
would still be ill-suited to the modern student-university relationship. The 
sheer weight of precedent in contract law suggests it would take much time 
and much creative litigation to turn the doctrine toward a more rigorous form 
of judicial review. Thus, what is needed is administrative oversight to 
promulgate a uniform set of rules to clearly lay out a university’s minimum 
standards of conduct and to provide students an alternative mechanism to 
redress grievances. This would also reduce the burden on the state and federal 
courts in dealing with aggrieved students for whom the courts can realistically 
provide no remedy except in cases of extraordinarily capricious action. And, 
more importantly, it would serve to enhance the educational experience of 
students and increase the public’s faith in these increasingly important and 
expensive institutions. 
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